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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought for the replevin of Seven 
Bermuda Units. The Defendants contend -th2.t the slid 
S•aven Bermuda Units are motor vehicles and subject to 
the provisions of SE·ction 3, Title 41, ·utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION iN-LOWER. COURT. 
The Court held that the said seven Bermuda Units 
vrere not motor vehicles and grantEd judgment to the 
Plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the Court affirm the judg-
ment of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There were numerous tearings in the District. Court 
of Grand County,_ State of U~~h,. -between the .. l~th ·day of 
June, 1963, and the lOth day of February, 1964. The De-
fendants called Mr .. Ross D .. Frands·E·n of the Utah State 
Tax Commission ss a witness. All other facts were stipu-
lated and undispubzd. In addition to· the facts stated in 
Appellant's: .Brief, the R:E·sponderit adds the following: 
The said Bermuda Units were each constructed in such 
a mann•er that axles and w·heels could h2· placed under tl)em· 
for the purpose of moving them upon the public h.~ghways, 
however, the said Bermuda Units were never . equip~ed 
with axles and wheels; excep.t when actually being trans-· 
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3 
ported, and no such ·t:·quipment was ever sold by 1\ilr. George 
Dannenhc.um to the D-efendants. 
Further, each Bermuda Unit consists of two separate 
apartments with separate 'e·ntrances. Each apartment has 
a kitchan, bedroom, and bath. 
All seven of the said Agreements were assignEd by 
Mr. Dannenbaum to the Plaintiff. The Def'Cndant made· 
regular monthly payments on the Agreement~ unti~ August 
1962, then they bE·cam-c delinquent and this suit w·as 
brought to recover the said seven Bermuda Units. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
THE SEVEN BERMUDA UNITS WERE NOT INTEND-
ED PRIMARILY FOR OPERATION ON THE PUBLIC 
HIGHVv AYS AND THEREFORE NOT MOTOR VE-
HICLES AS DEFINED BY SECTION 3, TITLE 41, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED. 
41-6-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, de-
fin2-s various types of hevicles as follows: 
"(a) ''Vehicle." Every device in, upon, or by which any 
p·arson or property is or may be transported or drawn 
upon a highway, except devices movEd by human 
power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or 
tracks. 
''(b) "Motor Vehicle." Every vehicl-a which is s£1f-
propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by el-
ectric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, 
but not operated upon rails.'' 
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· 41-6-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, de-
fines v2.rious typE·s of trailers as follows: 
" .... (c) "Trailer." Every vehick~ with or 'vithout 
motive powe!, other than a pole trailer, designed for 
carrying persons or propc:-rty and for being drawn by 
a motor v·2hicle and so constructed th2 t no part of its 
. ~eight rests upon the towing vehicle .... 
"(d) ''Semi-Trailer." Every vehicl.t:· with or without 
. motive· power, other than a pole trail·zr, designed for 
carrying. persons or property and for being drawn by 
a rnotor vehicle and so constructed that some part of 
its weight and that of its load rests upon or is carri•2d 
by another vehicle ... 
· ''{f) ''IIous2· Trailer.H A trailer or semi-trailer in ex-
cess of 1500 pounds gross weight whic~ is d·~signed, 
constructed, and equipped 2s a dwelling place, living 
abode, or slee:,Jing place, r-ither ~·armanently or tem-
porarily and is equipped for use as a conveyance on 
streets and highways, or .... 
"(g) ''Trailer or Semi-Trailer.'' A trailer or semi-
trailer whose chassis and exterior shell is design:c:d 
and constructed for us•z as a. House Trailer, as defined 
in p2ragraph (f), but which is used inst£-ad perman-
ently or temporarily for the advertising, sales, display, 
or promotion of· merchandise or service, or for any 
oth•ar commercial purposes rxcept the tr.1nsportation 
of property for hire or the transportation of property 
for ·distribution by a private carrier." 
The Motor Vebicle Act has definE-d Motor Vehicle, 
Trail·ar, Semi-Trailer, House Trailer, separ.1tely. It specif-
ically states that a Motor VE·hicle is one that is self pro-
pelled, and the U t.ah Court has so held. 
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In Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Ta..x 
Commission, 8 U. 2d 144; 329 P. 2d 650, the Court states 
as follows: 
-'' .... Under the Motor Vehicle· Act we find the .term 
Motor Ve:1icle, Trailer, and Semi-Trailer, significant-
ly d•ascribed separs tely. It states that a Motor V-£·hicle 
is one that is self-propelled. A Trailer is one without 
motive po"\ver .... drawn by a ,Motor Y.t:·hicle, and a 
Semi-Trailer is describ.zd as a vehicle without active 
power . . . . drE.. wn by a motor vebicle. The last two 
definitions do not lend themselves to ·any compelling 
conclusion that such pieces of equipment are· self-
propelled as in. the case with the definition of l\Iotor 
Vevicle. On the othE·r hand, the Motor V ~hicle Act, 
by tl"aatjpg _ then1_s~parately, would indicate an intent 
not to include trzilers and semi-trailers in ·the term 
·Motor Ve·hicle. Such conclusion is further substantiated 
_ in the section t~at requiras motor vehicles, trailers, 
and semi-trailers to be_ registered s·E·parately (Title 
41-1-19, U. C. A. 1953). If ·t,he cont.zntion of the tax 
. commission that a truck 2nd a trailer together are a 
1\iotor ·v2hicle, it would follow that tbe two pieces of 
equipment would be sub}act to but one· registration. 
This cannot: be done ·under·the registration statute. 
" . .£\side from the· stltutes themselves, very respectable 
authority (Hayes Freigbt Lines. v .. Cheatham, Okl. 
1954, 27'7 P. ?d 664, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1278; Prudential 
Ins. Co. of Great Britain v. Associated Emp. Lloyds, 
supra; Vest v. Kramer, Ohio App. 1951, 111 N. E. 2d 
696, where the st.atuts· is very similar to Utah's Gen~ 
dre·zu v. State Farm Fire Ins. Co., of Bloomington, IlL, 
1939, 206 Minn. 237, 288 N~· W. 225, contra.) treats 
a motor vehicle and & pieee of tandem equipm·Ent as 
being mutually exclusive at least if they are not [ r·-
tually operational by attacbm·E·nt, and as a unit, - ~~ 
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problern not presented here. 'The attitudes of courts 
that hg,ve had th·a question befor2· them, succinctly are 
summarized in 60 C. J. S. Motor Ve:r1icles: 1, p. 110, 
where it is said: 
''A trailer or semitrailer is a vehicle:·, but is not a motor 
vehicle except that insofar as it ficilitates the primary 
function of a motor vehicle of transporting persons 
and things, after being attacbed to the motor vehicle 
for that purpose, it m:1y be r•agarded as becoming a 
party of the. motor .. vehicle, although as to the latter 
pro:position t!lere is also authority to the contrary. 
"A N·ew York Case (Henn·assy v. Walker, 1938, 279 
N.Y. 94, 17 N. E. 2d 782, 784, 119 A. L. R. 1029) hold-
ing thE t trJ.ilers and semi-trailers were not motor ve-
hicles, pointed out that: 
"Trailers and semi~tr2.i}3rs are vehicles within the 
· mea·ning of t~1e Vehicl,e and Traffic Law, ***but 
they are not Motor Vehicles. The Legislature hav-
ing defined and classifiot:d a tr1iler and semi-trailer 
as Pc:Qarate and distinct vehicles, ***itl is presumed 
that it would have referred to thE·m by name had 
it intended to include them within the provisions 
of Section 59. 
''W,a approve that the above·· statement and consider 
it particularly applicable to our statutes and t'h€· def-
initions therein cont:1ined • . . ." 
The seven Bermuda Units certainly cannot qualify ·as 
n1otor vehic:•zs. under the-· general provisions of Title 41, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, r s a1nended. The question 
then is w:1ethe:r or not the said B·E·rmud~ Units are "Motor 
v~hicles" as·: the term is defined by the provisions of 41-
3-7 TJtah Code Annotated, 1953, as am·e·nded which states: 
''41-3-7. Definitions - l\!Iotor ve:1ic.Ie des lers' adnlini-
strator, - Appointn1ent - Supervision by state t.1x 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
commission. - The following 'vords a·nd phrases, when 
usrd in this act, shall for the pur_nose of this act, ihave 
the meaning respectively ascribed zs follows, to wit: 
' (a) Motor Vehicle. Every v•zhicle intended primar-
ily for uss· and operation on the public highways 
,vhich is self -propelled; and every vehicle intended 
PRilVIARIL Y for operation on the public hig':1,vays 
which is not driven or :propelled by its O\Vn power, but 
which is d·asign& ted either to be attacihed to and be-
come a part of, or to be drawn by a self-propellEd 
vehicle; but not including farm tractors and other 
machines and tools used in the production, iharvest-
ing, and cEre of farm products ... '' 
In Charvos v. Bonn·zville . Irrig. Dist., 120 U. 480, 235 
P. 2d 780, in interpr.Eting the word "Primary" the Court 
states: 
''The argument that t'he words . 'Primary Cause,' 
should be interpreted as n1•aaning 'sole .cause,' can have 
no merit since the word 'Primary' cannotes the exist-
ance· of plurality, while t~~'le word 'sole' cannotE·s the 
singular." · 
In construing the language of the s'tc.tute with the 
above cited case, one must CE·rtainly r•zach the conclusion 
tbat the legislature recognized that there wer·a soni~ .. items 
of p~rsonll property. that me y be ·.drawn upon a public 
highway frcm time to timE· by a motor v·zhicle that would 
not fall within the J:rovisions oi the statute. 
In· further analyzing the statute, and specific2.lly thl! 
phrase ''Intended Primlrily for Operation on thE· Public 
Hignway2.,'' it is clear that one must look to the use and 
operE.tion of ·any. vehicle in order to establish its primary 
purpose:·. Pacific Northw'Cst Alloys v. State,. 306, P 2d 197, 
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1957, Washington Case, the· Court in discussing the words 
''Primary Purpose,'' states: 
''What do t~1e words ''Primary Purpose" mean. A car-
dinal rule of statutary construction is that the words 
to be constru•3d must be given th~c:·ir usual and ordinary 
meaning. State v. Houck, 1949, 32 Wash. 2d 681, 685, 
203 P 2d 693; Sandona v. City of Cle Elum, 1951, 37 
Wash. 2d 831, 837, 226, P. 2d 889. In Black's Law Dic-
tionary · (4th Ed.) , "Primary" is ·designed as first, 
principal, chief, leading. '~Primary Purpose" is defined 
as "That which is first in intention, which is funda-
m·e·ntal." 
See also People of the State of California ex rei. Ern-
est D. Breuning, County Surveyor of the County of Shasta, 
State of California v. Raymond H. BE>rry and Scott Lumber 
Company, a corporation, 304 P. 2d 818. 
In consideraing use as an element in determining. the 
primary' :IJ'ufpose of the said Bermuda· Units in question, 
one· ca:n har~~y. cons~der them to b·3 vehicles. From son1e-
time prior to October of 1961 for the five Units and prior 
to December 1961 for tbe other t\vo Units, thesra Units hav~ 
bee·n dn the public highway but .two times, ~nd in each of 
those· ca·ses 1t took special equipment ·to move them. 
In. addition to needing spe.ci3l equipment to move· these 
Unit.s, they also have· the .distinction ·of b·aing able to house 
two separate families in the t\vo separate ap.1rtments in 
each Unit, which apzrtments can be rented at different 
times and for different periods of time. 
The present case is Vtary similar to the Motel Case spo-
ken ~f by Mr. Ross D. FrandsE·n from the Ut3!h Stste Tax 
Commission, who testified ~s follows: 
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"Well, now let me €xplain that. The specific. unit that 
I was talking about or that we were talking about was 
a motel that was he-ing constructed in Cedar City, 
Utah. No\v this rnotel vvas built out of state and brought 
into this state "\Vith three units of the motel together. 
They were broug,bt in on thr~E·e sets of axles and set up 
as a motel in Cedar City. It's the only one that I know 
of. Now that was purchas•cd out of state and was 
brought in along t~e highway. That is the only one 
that I knovv of. That is the sp2·cific one." (Page 6 of Tr.) 
It is logical to assume from Mr. Frandsen's testimony that 
The Utlh St2-te Tax Commission does not take the rigid 
position the defendants advocate. That it is nE·cessary to 
consider the use for which the Units shall be put to before 
they can be classEd as "1\lotor Vehicles.'' 
POINT II. 
THE ASSIG~lMENT OF THE SEVEN CONDITION-
AL SALES AGREEMENTS BY GEORGE DANNEN-
BAUM, A RESIDENT OF THE STATE OF NE'V MEX-
ICO, TO THE PL.t'.LINTIFF, AND THE COLLECTIONS 
MADE PURSUANT TO SAID AGREEMENTS BY THE 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ''DOING BUSINESS" IN THE STArrE 
OF UTAH, WITHIN THE MEANI~TG OF THE STATUTE. 
16-10-102 Utah Code .A.nnots.ted 1953, as amended, 
states in part: 
'' .... ¥/ithout excluding obber activities which may 
constitute trensacting business in this State, foreign 
corporations shall net b·a considered to be transacting 
businE·ss in this state, for the purpose of this act, by 
reason of carrying on in this state any one or n1ore 
of tbe following activities: 
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''. . . . (g) Creating evidence· of debt, mortgages or 
liens on r2al or personal property. 
'' .... (k) Acquiring, in transactings (transactions) 
outside Utah or in interstate commerce, of condi-
tional sale contracts or of &abts secured by mort-
gages or liens on real or pE··rsonal property i'n Utah, 
collecting or adjusting or (of) principal and interest. 
payments thereon, enforcing or adjusting any rights 
and (in) prop~rty provided for in said conditional 
sale contracts or sE·curing sE id debts, taking any 
actions necessary to preserve and protect the inter-
est of the conditional v·andor in the propE·rty cover-
ed by said conditional sale contracts or t~e interest 
of the mortgagee or holder of ths· lien in said s~cur-
ity, or any combination of such transactions ... " 
See G·aneral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Lund, 60 U. 247, 
208 P. 502; East Co3st Discount Corp. v. Reynolds, 7 U. 
2d 362, 325 p. 2d 853. 
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CONCLUSION 
To allow thtS DefE-ndants to prevail in the present cause 
would be a great miscarriage of justice, and would be· con-
trary to the express intent of the legislatur~·. It is very 
app2.rent when considering the language used by the said 
legislature, that there are some items of personal property 
that may from time to time be attached to a motor v·~hicle 
and drawn upon the public highway, that do not fall with-
in the provisions of the statute. 
That the seven B·2·rmuda Units are not intended pri-
marily for operation on the public highv1ay and therefore 
not motor vebicles under the law. 
That the Plaintiff Corporation is not doing busin£·ss 
in the State of Utah, "\vithin the meaning of the statute. 
'Fnat judgment should be affirmed and Plainiff should 
recover its costs. 
Resps·ctfully submitted, 
HARRY E. SNOW 
Attorney for Thorp Finance Corporation 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
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